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I. INTRODUCTION
As a threshold matter, landowner liability in premises liability 
actions varies according to the evolutionary stage of a particular 
jurisdiction.1  Historically, courts refused to recognize a
landowner’s duty to protect visitors from dangerous conditions on 
† Winona State University, B.A. 1998; William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. 
Candidate 2004.
1. See Edward A. Strenkowski, Case Note, Tort Liability of Owners and Possessors
of Land – A Single Standard of Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances Toward Invitees 
and Licensees, 33 ARK. L. REV. 194, 198-200 (1979) (citing O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 
N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977) to illustrate that in premises liability cases, some 
courts moved from duty based on entrant status to a reasonable care standard for 
all entrants).
1
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the premises.2  Societal trends, however, gradually expanded
landowners’ duties to entrants, initially according to the entrant’s 
status.3  Through time, the lines defining “status” became blurred, 
and many jurisdictions abandoned the classification altogether.4
Minnesota is currently among the increasing number of
jurisdictions holding that landowners owe a duty of reasonable care 
to all lawful land entrants.5
Recently, in Louis v. Louis, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
further fortified its conception of a landowner’s duty to visitors.  In 
Louis, the court rejected a landowner’s argument that absence of a 
special relationship6 between the landowner and entrant should 
exculpate the landowner of any duty to exercise reasonable care 
toward the entrant.7  Building on past decisions,8 the Louis court 
rightfully held that all lawful entrants are owed the same duty of 
care, irrespective of whether a special relationship exists between 
the landowner and entrant.9
This case note explores the historical progression of legal 
authority concerning duty and special relationships in negligence 
cases–specifically premises liability negligence cases–on a national
level.10  This note then narrows the scope of the discussion
concerning duty and special relationships, focusing on the manner 
in which Minnesota applies special relationships to duty in basic 
negligence cases, as well as premises liability cases grounded on 
negligence theories.11  The third portion of this note explores the 
facts, procedural history, and holding in Louis v. Louis.12  Finally, 
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, 
at 386 (5th ed. 1984).
3. Strenkowski, supra note 1, at 198-200.
4. Id.
5. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972) 
(abolishing common law rules based on invitee and licensee status).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (stating that a special 
relationship giving rise to duty typically involves common carriers, innkeepers, 
possessors of land who hold it open to the public, and persons who have custody 
of another person that deprives that third person of the opportunity to protect 
himself); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 56, at 376-77 (stating that courts have also 
recognized relationships between jailers and prisoners, schools and students,
husbands and wives, and parents and children).
7. 636 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 (Minn. 2001).
8. See Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647 (stating that all invited 
entrants upon land are owed the same duty of reasonable care).
9. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 321.
10. See infra Part II.A-B.
11. See infra Part II.C-D.
12. See infra Part III.A-B.
2
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this note explores arguments that justify the Louis decision13 and 
concludes that the holding in Louis was judicious and consistent 
with past decisions in premises liability cases.14
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Origin of Duty and Duty of Landowners
Notions of liability emerged in England long before
contemporary duty theories existed.15  Early English courts imposed 
liability and rarely inquired into fault, the relationship between 
opposing parties, or any affirmative obligations the parties may 
have had to protect each other.16
By the mid- to late-nineteenth century, however, myriad
English court decisions17 and legal commentators18 began
developing modern notions of liability based on fault, relationship, 
and legal obligation.  American jurisprudence adopted England’s 
fault-based theories in the mid-nineteenth century,19 and although 
13. See infra Part IV.A-B.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 (1936); id.
at 375-82 (discussing the lack of a concept of duty in early England, and that an 
actor was liable for any damages resulting from a wrongful act); Percy H. Winfield, 
Comment, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41, 48-49 (1934) (stating 
that a defendant is liable even if the harm was inadvertent or unintentional).
16. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 53, at 357.  Instead of owing an 
obligation to the other party or to an individual, “[t]he defendant’s obligation to 
behave properly apparently was owed to all the world, and he was liable to any 
person whom he might injure by his misconduct.” Id.
17. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. D. 1842) (developing 
the rule that the defendant must be under a legal obligation to the plaintiff in 
order to be liable for any wrongdoing); Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 
(C.P.D. 1837); Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. D. 1837).
18. See Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (Eng. C.A. 1893).  Lord Esher 
states, “[t]he question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is 
established that the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person 
who seeks to make him liable for his negligence . . . .” Id.  See also FREDERICK
POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 468 (13th ed. 1920) (stating the famous quote concerning 
duty, “[n]egligence in the air, so to speak, will not do”).
19. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (holding that to recover 
damages, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant is chargeable with “some fault, 
negligence, carelessness or want of prudence . . .”).  Legal historians generally
regard Brown as the case that abandoned strict liability and replaced it with a fault-
based system in the United States. Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to 
Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 DET. C. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1207, 1211-12
(1995).
3
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it is difficult to ascertain exact origin,20 the United States adopted 
England’s concept of duty in the late-nineteenth century.21
This newly adopted concept of duty soon became one of the 
cornerstones of American tort liability.  Duty, as one of the
elements comprising negligence,22 was codified by the First
Restatement of Torts in 1934.23  The standards concerning duty set 
by these early scholars and courts remain immutable to this day: 
liability for breach of duty depends on whether the defendant owes 
a duty to the plaintiff.24  Duty, in turn, arises when the plaintiff’s 
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s 
conduct.25
Though most plaintiffs injured on another person’s land
traditionally sought recovery under negligence theories,26 the
subjective nature of duty27 embedded in negligence long provided a 
safe haven for landowners.  In fact, courts have limited liability in 
premises liability actions more than in any other area of law.28  The 
rationale is historical: premises liability laws trace back to feudalism 
and a culture “deeply rooted to the land.”29  At a time when land 
20. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations on the Law of Torts,
53 AM. L. REG. 209, 209 (1905) (stating “[i]t is surprising to find that every attempt
to announce either judicially or in textbooks any inclusive affirmative principle of 
the origin of duty of care, the primary fundamental requisite, has been
unsuccessful”).
21. See, e.g., MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS FOR THE 
USE OF STUDENTS 313 (1896) (stating that a defendant can be liable for negligence
if the defendant owed the plaintiff “the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill, or 
diligence, or all of these, according to the situation”) (citing Membury v. Great W. 
Ry. Co., 14 App. Cas. 179, 190 (1889)); Rader v. Davis, 134 N.W. 849, 850 (Iowa 
1912) (holding that there was no liability absent breach of a legal duty).
22. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1014, 1022 (1928) (setting forth the four elements of negligence, including 
duty).
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1934).
24. See, e.g., M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 1992).
But see Jordan K. Kolar, Is This Really the End of Duty?  The Evolution of the Third 
Restatement of Torts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 233, 245 (2002) (stating that the Discussion 
Drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts indicate that rather than portraying 
duty as a requisite of tort liability, an individual is liable for harm caused by 
negligent conduct “unless the court makes a finding of ‘no-duty’ based on 
considerations of policy or principle”).
25. Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 287.
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 57, at 387.
27. William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1953).
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 57, at 386.
29. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 170-71, 199 N.W.2d 639, 645-46 (1972) 
(quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 
(1959)). See also William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV.
4
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ownership determined an individual’s value in society, the fear of 
interfering with a landowner’s free use of property significantly 
outweighed the desire to compensate injured plaintiffs.30
Over time, case law and societal trends governing a
landowner’s duty to entrants upon his or her land underwent 
radical transformation.31  As societal interest shifted from
protection of land to protection of individuals, courts slowly eroded 
the many protections once afforded to landowners.32  Over time, 
landowners gradually became the largest group upon whom the 
duty of affirmative conduct was imposed.33
The duty of landowners, however, differs among jurisdictions.
Some jurisdictions hold that the duty of care owed to an entrant 
depends on the entrant’s status, while others hold that landowners
owe a duty of reasonable care regardless of the entrant’s status.34
Nevertheless, landowners generally are not liable for physical harm 
caused by an open and obvious danger resulting from a condition 
on the land unless the danger of the harm was reasonably
foreseeable.35
573, 576-85 (1942) (summarizing the development and transitions of the common 
law categories in England and the United States).
30. Norman S. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and 
Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REV. 182, 184 (1953).
31. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 57-64; Prosser, supra note 29, 
at 576-85; GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF PREMISES
LIABILITY §§ 6.1-6.9 (3d ed. 2001) (noting historical developments and current 
trends in premises liability actions). Early common law rules held that the duty 
owed by a landowner to an entrant depended upon the status of the entrant.
Entrants were placed into one of three categories: invitee, licensee, or trespasser, 
with the category determining the extent of the landowner’s duty to the entrant.
Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 662 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ohio 
1996).  The degrees of care owed to entrants gradually changed and in 1972, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a landowner has a duty “to use reasonable 
care for the safety of all . . . persons invited upon the premises.” Balach, 294 Minn. 
at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.  By 2000, approximately twenty-five jurisdictions
abolished or limited the land entrant categories. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN,
TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURY 327 (4th ed. 2001).
32. See Prosser, supra note 29.
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 56, at 374.
34. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 31, at 327.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965). See generally W. Page 
Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. 
REV. 629 (1952) (summarizing aspects of the open and obvious rule and
concluding that a defendant’s liability should not be limited any more than in the 
Restatement).
5
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B. Historical Approach to Duty and Special Relationships
Although states apply the concept of duty differently, the 
predominant view is that a duty is owed to protect another
individual from harm when a special relationship exists between 
the parties36 and when the risk of harm is foreseeable.37  Often, 
special relationships are protective in nature38 and involve a
vulnerable individual39 or are relationships resulting in financial 
gains to a defendant.40  Therefore, society subjects individuals
within special relationships to greater expectations of care.41
Presently, special relationships that typically give rise to a duty 
to protect include common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land 
held open to the public, and persons who have custody of another
individual which deprives that individual of the opportunity to 
protect themselves.42  Furthermore, even if two parties are not 
categorized within any of the aforementioned relationships, courts 
may conclude that there is a special relationship between them as a 
matter of public policy.43  By way of illustration, courts have found 
relationships sufficient to create a duty between employers and 
36. See Jason Asmus, Case Note, Social Host Duty to Protect Guests: No Need for the 
Imposition of a Duty to Protect - Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999),
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1353, 1358 n.37 (2000).  Thirty-nine states recognize a 
duty to protect when a special relationship exists. See id.
37. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 
(1956) (stating that duty inquiries focus on whether the consequences of the 
alleged wrongful conduct should have been foreseen by the actor). But see 
Fleming James, Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 790-91 (1951)
(stating that when there is a breach of duty, a defendant may be liable for 
unforeseeable consequences of his or her actions).
38. Jonathan J. Hegre, Minnesota “Nice”?  Minnesota Mean: The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Protect Sexually Abused Children in H.B. ex rel. Clarke v.
Whittemore, 15 LAW & INEQ. 435, 444-45 (1997).
39. Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 
792 (Minn. 1995) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 56, at 374).  “Typically, the 
plaintiff is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the
defendant, who in turn holds considerable power over the plaintiff’s welfare.” Id.
40. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (quoting KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 56, at 374).  Keeton states that that in situations where the 
relationship between two individuals involves financial gain for the defendant, 
fairness requires that the defendant protect the plaintiff if the plaintiff expects 
protection, “which itself may be based upon the defendant’s expectation of 
financial gain.” Id.
41. Hegre, supra note 38, at 444-45.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
43. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989) (stating
that public policy is a significant consideration in identifying duty).
6
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employees,44 companions on a social venture,45 and a school and its 
students.46
III. DUTY IN MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed duty in Depue v. 
Flateau.47 Depue held that regardless of the relationship between 
two parties, an affirmative duty to avert injury to another person 
arises in circumstances in which a failure to use reasonable care 
obviously will result in injury to that person.48  Although Depue
imposed an affirmative duty to protect, Minnesota generally
adheres to the nonfeasance rule49 beyond the premises liability 
realm, mandating a legal duty only when the parties share a special 
relationship and the risk of harm is foreseeable.50
In Minnesota premises liability cases, however, a landowner’s 
affirmative duty to maintain land in a reasonably safe condition 
accompanies his or her right to possess the land.51  In 1972, 
Minnesota abolished the conventional duty doctrines based on 
entrant status and imposed a duty upon landowners to exercise 
44. See Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821, 823 
(1948).
45. Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (holding a special 
relationship existed between two males on a social venture, and one had the duty 
to seek medical assistance or notify someone of the other’s condition following an 
attack that occurred while they were together).
46. See Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994).  “Schools 
are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will 
be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of 
adequate supervision.” Id.
47. 100 Minn. 299, 303-04, 111 N.W. 1, 2-3 (1907).
48. Depue, 100 Minn. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2.  The Depue court noted that the 
facts of this case:
bring it within the more comprehensive principle that whenever a 
person is placed in such a position with regard to another that it is 
obvious that, if he does not use due care in his own conduct, he will 
cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to exercise care 
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds himself.
Id.
49. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 56, at 373 (defining “nonfeasance” as “a 
passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect [others] from harm”).
50. See Doe v. Brainerd Int’l Raceway, Inc. 533 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Minn. 1995); 
Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 
(Minn. 1995); Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989).
51. See Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320 n.7 (Minn. 2001) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 12, Topic 7 Scope Note (1965)).
7
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reasonable care toward all individuals invited on their premises.52
This newly imposed duty requires the landowner to inspect the 
premises for hazards, effectuate proper repairs as necessary,53 and 
warn entrants of conditions that may present an unreasonable risk 
of harm.54  Further, this duty applies to all unreasonable risks of 
harm, notwithstanding the source of the risk.55  Minnesota courts 
currently apply the following factors to adjudge whether a
landowner owes a duty to an entrant: (1) the circumstances and 
purpose for which entry was made; (2) the foreseeability or
possibility of harm; (3) the duty to inspect, repair, or warn; (4) the 
reasonableness of inspection or repair; and (5) the opportunity 
and ease of repair or correction.56
A. Special Relationships in Minnesota
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted sections 314 
and 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which pertain to 
special relationships giving rise to a duty to aid or protect in 
negligence actions.57  Pertinent portions of those sections assert 
that special relationships create a duty to warn, either when a 
landowner opens his or her land to the public, or when a person 
has control or custody over another individual (thereby making it 
impossible for that individual to protect himself).58 Although the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted these Restatement sections, the 
court conveyed that a special relationship is not the only
circumstance giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect.59
52. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).
53. See Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 n.1 (Minn. 1979) (citing MINN.
DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 330 G-S, 332 G-S (James L. Hetland, Jr. & Oscar C. 
Adamson II, rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, 280, 287 (2d ed. 1974). See also Louis,
636 N.W.2d at 319 n.4; Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647-48.
54. See Adee, 281 N.W.2d at 180. See also Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 319 n.4; Balach,
294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647-48.
55. Sullivan v. Farmers and Merchs. State Bank of New Ulm, 398 N.W.2d 592,
595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
56. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 322 n.9 (citing Bisher v. Homart Dev. Co., 328 
N.W.2d 731, 733 (Minn. 1983). See also MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 85.28
(Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, rep.) in 4A MINN. PRACTICE 1, 254-58(4th
ed. 1999).
57. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483-84 (Minn. 1979).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
59. See, e.g., Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483-84 (holding that hunters, who were 
strangers to the landowner, owed a duty to the landowner despite the lack of a 
8
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Historically, duty determinations in premises liability actions 
differed if the action entailed land conditions as opposed to
conduct on the land.  The decisions concerning land conditions 
have never mentioned special relationships as a means by which to 
create a duty to protect against hazardous conditions on premises.60
Further, the courts consistently distinguish duty concerning
conditions on land based on premises liability theories from duty 
created by a special relationship related to the negligent conduct of 
the defendant or others on a premises.61  This distinction is also 
explicitly maintained in the Second Restatement,62 as well as other 
secondary sources.63
In summary, the above cases and commentary were the genesis
for the court’s finding in Louis that duty based on a special 
relationship is “separate and distinct” from duty based on premises 
liability theories.64  More importantly, this precedent establishes 
special relationship because they were “engaged in an extremely dangerous
activity”).
60. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1997) (discussing
duty of a landowner to an electrician who sustained injuries while working on the 
premises, with no mention of a special relationship); Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493 
(Minn. 1985) (discussing duty of a landowner for hazardous conditions on the 
premises, with no mention of a special relationship); Peterson v. Balach, 294 
Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972) (discussing duty of a cabin owner for death of a 
guest caused by carbon monoxide emanating from a gas refrigerator on the 
premises, with no mention of a special relationship).
61. See, e.g., Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1999)
(determining that duty can evolve from a special relationship between the parties 
when defendant fails to seek medical attention for the plaintiff, rather than
exploring negligence under premises liability theories based upon conditions on 
the property); H.B. v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 708-09 (Minn. 1996) (holding
that because a trailer park manager did not have a special relationship with 
children residing in the trailer park, she owed no duty to protect them from 
another resident who sexually molested them).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 12, Topic 7 Scope Note (1965) 
(stating that landowner’s duty to maintain land in a reasonably safe condition is 
specifically addressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328E-379 rather than 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sections concerning special relationships).
63. 3 STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 14:3, at 830
(1986). “In short, the common law has never seen fit to extend its principles of 
general negligence (as they came to be fashioned in the last century) to govern 
harm occasioned on the premises of others.” Id. See also FRANCIS H. BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 162-63, 174 (1926) (noting that decisions concerning
landowner’s liability to entrants injured on his premises are divided into two 
groups: “those in which the injuries are caused by the owner’s acts and those 
caused by the condition of his premises,” and further noting that the courts have 
frequent difficulty determining whether the entrant’s injury is due to “active 
misconduct” or failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition).
64. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. 2001).
9
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that a special relationship is not essential to create a duty in 
premises liability actions.65
IV. THE LOUIS DECISION
A. Facts
In 1995, Robert Louis (“Appellant”) installed an aboveground 
swimming pool in his backyard and attached a slide to the shallow 
end of the pool.66  Appellant did not believe that there was danger
in sliding down the slide head or feet first.67
On August 2, 1997, Appellant invited family members to his 
home for a gathering.68  He gave permission to guests to use his 
pool and slide, but did not post warnings concerning the slide.69
Steven Louis (“Respondent”), Appellant’s adult brother, observed 
children and another adult brother performing headfirst “belly 
slides” down the slide and decided to slide down the slide
headfirst.70  Before doing so, he consulted a diagram on the slide 
showing the proper “belly slide” position.71  When Respondent slid 
down the slide, he hit the bottom of the pool and sustained a burst 
fracture of his C6 vertebrae.72
Respondent originally sued Appellant for negligence based on 
premises liability theories.73  Appellant moved for summary
judgment on two grounds.74  First, Appellant argued that he owed 
no duty of care to Respondent because a special relationship did 
not exist between the two men.75  Second, Appellant argued that 
Respondent primarily assumed the risk of harm by using the slide.76
The district court denied Appellant’s motion concerning primary 
assumption of risk.77  It did, however, grant his motion concerning 
duty, reasoning that Appellant did not owe a duty because there 
65. Id. at 320 n.7.
66. Id. at 316.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 317.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 317, 320.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
10
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was no evidence that Appellant had actual or constructive
knowledge of any danger concerning the slide.78
Respondent appealed the district court’s decision that
Appellant did not owe a duty to him.79  The court of appeals 
reversed the district court’s holding concerning duty, stating that 
there were disputed issues of material fact.80  Appellant then 
petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review concerning 
the duty issue.81
B. The Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ 
decision concerning duty and remanded the case to the district 
court.82  The Minnesota Supreme Court instructed the district court 
to determine if Respondent knew of and appreciated the danger of 
the slide and whether the slide was an obvious danger.83  If so, 
Appellant may have owed a duty to Respondent.84
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court found no merit in 
Appellant’s argument that he did not owe a duty to Respondent 
absent a special relationship between them.85  The court noted that 
Respondent’s claim was based on premises liability theories, rather 
than a special relationship.86 The court emphasized that a special 
relationship duty “is separate and distinct from a duty based on . . .
premises liability.”87  When a negligence claim is based on a theory 
of premises liability, the court reasoned, the existence of duty is not 
contingent on whether a special relationship exists between the 
parties.88
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LOUIS DECISION
In Louis, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a prudent 
decision when it refused to limit landowners’ liability for injuries 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 318.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 321.
83. Id. at 322.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 320.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 320-21.
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resulting from dangerous conditions on their premises.89  Premises 
liability actions are based on the condition of a landowner’s
property.90  In contrast, duty based upon a special relationship 
places more emphasis on specific conduct and activities, taking it 
outside the realm of premises liability.91 Louis is a logical extension 
of prior cases holding that a landowner owes the same duty to all
lawful entrants, “regardless of the status of the individuals” in 
premises liability cases.92
In application, the Louis decision does not increase the burden 
of landowners nor will it result in judicial inefficiency.93  The 
decision promotes good public policy and allows courts to properly 
focus on the foreseeability of harm from dangerous land
conditions.94
A. Landowners’ Burden Under Louis
Increasing the landowner’s legal and economic burden greatly 
concerned those opposed to modifying landowner liability under 
common law theories.95  As noted by courts adopting the
reasonable care standard, however, such burdens on landowners 
are more myth than reality.96  Furthermore, such decisions do not 
diminish judicial efficiency.97
The argument that the reasonable care standard increases a 
89. Id. (indicating that the duty of landowners is not limited to situations in 
which there is a special relationship between the landowner and the entrant).
90. See id. at 320 (stating that the cases relied upon by appellant did not 
discuss duty based on premises liability theories because the cases did not concern 
a condition on the defendants’ land).
91. Id.
92. See Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980) (citing Peterson v. 
Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)).
93. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
94. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
95. See Marsh, supra note 30, at 184-85.  Landowners held a privileged 
position and courts limited the number of cases in which they recognized
landowners’ responsibility for reasonably foreseen harms. Id.
96. Scurti v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that 
adopting the reasonable care standard for all entrants does not pose an
unreasonable burden on the use of property because all that is required is 
reasonable care under the circumstances). See also Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 
43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (stating that “in a rural society with sparse land settlements 
and large estates, it would have been unduly burdensome to obligate the owner to 
inspect and maintain distant holdings for a class of entrants who were using the 
property ‘for their own convenience,’” but that further immunity for landowners is 
no longer justified considering that we live in a more “urban industrial society”).
97. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
12
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landowner’s legal burden is simply too convoluted to contain any 
merit.  Because landowner liability is rooted in negligence, courts 
have never suggested that a landowner must ensure the absolute
safety of an entrant,98 nor have they ever held a landowner liable 
for “trivial imperfections.”99  Instead, courts generally take a
common-sense approach in premises liability actions.
First, a landowner clearly has a duty to inspect his or her 
property, 100 but precedent explicitly states that a landowner is only 
required to use reasonable care under the circumstances.101  This is 
true regardless of the entrant’s status.  In addition, this duty is 
modified according to the specific use of the land.102  Further, 
entrants are responsible for their conduct and must themselves act 
with reasonable care under the circumstances.103
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 343A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.104  Section 343A limits 
landowner liability by asserting that a landowner is not liable for 
harm caused by a condition or activity on his or her premises if the 
danger is “known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”105
Finally, Louis did not modify previous decisions concluding 
98. See, e.g., Zuercher v. N. Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 171, 66 N.W.2d 892, 
896 (1964); Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 245, 24 N.W.2d 
42, 45 (1946); Rinn v. Minn. State Agric. Soc’y, 611 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000) (stating that a landowner is not an insurer of safety).
99. Helms v. Am. Legion, Inc., 213 N.E.2d 734, 735 (Ohio 1966) (stating that 
a landowner is not liable for trivial imperfections).
100. Otto v. City of St. Paul, 460 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)).
101. See Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647 (stating that the duty 
owed by a landowner to lawful entrants is to use reasonable care, which is “no 
more and no less than that of any other alleged tortfeasor”). See also Johnson v. 
Alford & Neville, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. 1986) (holding that a
landowner does not breach his or her duty of reasonable care when, “absent 
extraordinary circumstances, [the] landowner waits a reasonable time after the 
end of a storm before removing ice and snow”).
102. Otto, 460 N.W.2d at 362 (quoting Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 
647).
103. Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.
104. See Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496-97, 144 N.W.2d 
555, 557 (1966).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965). See also Louis v. Louis, 
636 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Minn. 2001); Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 
1997) (stating that a landowner may have reason to anticipate harm when he or 
she “has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or 
obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of 
doing so would outweigh the apparent risk”).
13
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that landowners owe a duty of reasonable care to all invited persons 
on land.106  Although a landowner may owe a duty to an entrant 
absent a special relationship,107 a landowner generally does not 
have a duty to exercise reasonable care toward trespassers who are 
not reasonably expected to enter his or her property.108  Thus, the 
Louis decision did not increase the classes and sheer numbers of
persons toward whom a landowner must exercise his or her duty of 
reasonable care.109
The above common-sense safeguards rectify what would
otherwise result in overly harsh theories requiring landowners to 
become insurers of safety, which would increase landowners’ legal 
burdens.  Notwithstanding relief from liability compelled by these 
safeguards, a landowner always has the opportunity to demonstrate 
that taking extra precautions is unduly burdensome.110
Regardless of the above safeguards, landowners may depict
Louis as a source of additional economic burden.  This depiction, 
however, is unrealistic: in the 1970s, courts concluded that a duty to 
exercise reasonable care regardless of the entrant’s status would 
not reduce the availability or increase the cost of insurance.111  The 
106. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 318; Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.
107. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 320-21. See also MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS’N,
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL)
JIG 85.22 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, rep.) in 4A MINN. PRACTICE 1, 
249-50 (4th ed. 1999) (defining an “entrant” as a person who enters or stays on the 
property of another [and is not a trespasser]”).
108. Croaker v. Mackenhausen, 592 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Minn. 1999) (stating 
that landowners generally owe no duty to trespassers); see also Flom v. Flom, 291 
N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980). But see Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 500, 83 
N.W.2d 252, 257 (1957) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 335 (1965), 
which states that a landowner is liable to a trespasser for failure to warn of an 
artificial condition that he created or maintained if: (1) it is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily harm; (2) the landowner has actual knowledge of the danger and 
(3) the danger is concealed or hidden from the trespasser).
109. See Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 318 (following the Balach holding that a
landowner owes a duty of reasonable care for all those invited upon the premises); 
Flom, 291 N.W. 2d at 917 (stating that the duty of a landowner “as to licensees and 
invitees is no more and no less than that of any other alleged tortfeasor, and that 
duty is to use reasonable care for the safety of all such persons invited upon the 
premises, regardless of the status of the individuals”).
110. See Scurti v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798 (N.Y. 1976).  “The 
defendant can always show that it would have been unduly burdensome to have 
done more.” Id.
111. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567-68 (stating that although the 
cost of insurance will depend on the rules of liability adopted, “there is no 
persuasive evidence that applying ordinary principles of negligence law to the land 
occupier’s liability will materially reduce the prevalence of insurance due to 
14
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courts theorized that even if insurance costs increased, commercial 
landowners would absorb the brunt of the impact and could spread 
the increased cost of insurance among large sectors of society to 
minimize the overall impact.112
Undisputedly, liability insurance premiums have significantly 
increased over past years.113  There is, however, no conclusive 
empirical evidence determining the degree to which tort litigation 
influenced changes in premium rates because there are many 
factors that contribute to the rising costs of insurance.114
Regardless, well-established tort principles penalize the wrongdoer 
rather than the injured party.115  Society should not grant
defendants permission to use financial hardship as an excuse to 
disregard the duty of reasonable care to others.116
In summary, although the absence of a special relationship 
cannot abrogate landowner duty, Louis did not create additional 
obligations for landowners.117  The Louis court merely re-articulated
Minnesota precedent concerning landowner duty. Louis clearly 
indicates the direction of future rulings while not increasing
landowner burden.
increased cost or even substantially increase the cost”).
112. Id.; Kathryn E. Eriksen, Case Note, Premises Liability in Texas – Time for a 
“Reasonable” Change, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 417, 447 (1986) (citing majority opinion in 
Smith v. Arbaugh’s Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).  The majority in 
Smith indicates that modern tort law is moving toward enterprise liability, which 
distributes loss over large sectors of society through insurance to reduce the 
economic impact of negligence liability. Id. See also Mark J. Welter, Premises
Liability: A Proposal to Abrogate the Status Distinctions of “Trespasser,” “Licensee” and 
“Invitee” as Determinative of a Land Occupier’s Duty of Care Owed to an Entrant, 33 S.D. 
L. REV. 66, 89 (1988).
113. MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 115 (Temple University 
Press 1995).
114. Id. at 110.  Insurers take the position that courts’ acceptance of the 
insurance rationale, or loss spreading, produced pro-plaintiff rulings by courts and 
excessive jury awards. Id. at 112-13.  Lawyers point to the methods by which 
insurance companies practice business, and propose fundamental changes in 
insurance regulation to solve the problem. Id. at 113-14.
115. See, e.g., Welter, supra note 112, at 87 (arguing that modern tort law 
supports such allocation of burden); Arthur R. Goodhart, Unforeseeable Consequences
of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449, 465 (1930) (stating that “if defendant’s act has 
the quality of wrongfulness and that where one of two persons must lose, it is the 
wrongdoer who ought to suffer”).
116. Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
117. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 (Minn. 2001) (reaffirming that 
landowners are not liable for open and obvious dangers and that a special 
relationship is unnecessary to create a landowner duty).
15
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B. Judicial Efficiency after Louis
Courts in all jurisdictions are increasingly concerned with 
mounting caseloads and the increasing capital and court calendar
space devoted to jury trials.118  Critics of the Louis holding may 
allege that the case exacerbates this problem because premises 
liability actions are now less likely to be subject to summary
judgment motions for lack of duty.119  These critics may further
argue that as an inevitable result of Louis, juries will hear more 
cases to determine if landowners exercised reasonable care, thus 
contributing to increased court dockets and decreased judicial 
efficiency.120
The argument is moot, however, because Minnesota premises 
liability cases concerning land conditions have never discussed duty 
in terms of special relationships.121  In actuality, Louis’ recitation of 
precedent will improve judicial efficiency: the decision will deter 
unnecessary motions and hearings for arguments regarding the 
presence of a special relationship and commensurate duty in
premises liability cases.122
VI. PUBLIC POLICY GOALS AND FORESEEABILITY
CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND LOUIS
Public policy determines whether plaintiffs’ interests warrant 
legal protection.123  While good public policy promotes equal
118. J. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Dispute
Resolution Methods: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on 
the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984).  “Experimentation with
new methods in the judicial system is imperative given growing case loads, delays, 
and increasing costs.” Id.
119. See Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 318; Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian 
Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995); Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 
287, 289 (Minn. 1985) (stating that duty is a question of law for the court to 
decide).
120. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 37, at 237 (stating that the question of 
whether a defendant used reasonable care under the circumstances is generally 
for the jury to decide).
121. See supra note 60 (referencing past decisions that did not apply special 
relationships to premises liability cases involving the condition of land).
122. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 320-21; see also Comment, Torts -- Landowner’s Liability
– Traditional Distinctions Between Trespassers, Licensees and Invitees Abolished as
Determinative of the Standard of Care Owed a Visitor, 25 ALA. L. REV. 401, 411 (1973) 
(stating that if more jury trials resulted, the increase should be offset “by a 
decrease in litigation and appeals on preliminary questions regarding the
entrant’s status . . .”).
123. M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 1992).
16
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protection and safety of all individuals entering another’s land,124
safety was not always at the forefront of premises liability actions.
Auspiciously, legal philosophy has transformed from demanding 
immunity for landowners to a more humanitarian focus on
compensating the injured.125  Society now places greater
importance on human safety than on landowners’ unrestricted 
freedom.126  One court zealously extended this position, stating that 
focus “upon the status of the injured party,” rather than on the 
nature of the injury or the negligence of the landowner, “is 
contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values.”127
Unquestionably, reasonable landowners use care to diligently 
protect themselves against injury on their own land.128  A landowner 
is just as likely as an entrant on his or her premises to sustain injury 
caused by a dangerous condition on the premises.129  Out of 
consideration for their fellow members of society, landowners
should not deduce that injustice occurs because they must
maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition for all lawful 
entrants; the landowners should do so to protect themselves.130
The Louis court declined to limit landowner liability by
distinguishing individuals with whom a landowner has a special 
relationship from other entrants.131  In so doing, Louis strives to 
provide equal protection to all land entrants,132 consistent with 
124. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).  “A man’s life or limb 
does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of 
compensation under the law . . .” depending upon the reason a person enters a 
landowner’s property. Id.
125. Eriksen, supra note 112, at 440.
126. O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977). See also BOHLEN,
supra note 63, at 188.  The vague legal maxim, “Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,”
(“in the use of one’s own rights must not injure others in the exercise of their 
rights”) should apply to those who enter another’s property and are injured as a 
result of a danger on the property. Id.
127. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568.
128. Charles P. Dribben, Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees 
and Invitees, 22 MO. L. REV. 186, 191 (1957).
129. Id.
130. Id.
Being required by law to use care with respect to those who come for 
his purposes, he should not be heard to complain or consider himself 
inconvenienced, should he be required, out of human considerations, 
to remedy those same danger which will produce that same harm 
whether the injured person be owner, invitee or social guest. 
Id.
131. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 (Minn. 2001).
132. See Rowland, 443 P.2d at 569 (abolishing categories of entrants and
substituting the general duty of reasonable care, noting that creating more
17
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public policy goals articulated by past Minnesota Supreme Court 
decisions.133
These goals allow courts to properly focus on the foreseeability 
of injury.134  Foreseeability in Minnesota is fundamentally
intertwined in modern premises liability law.135  Despite other issues 
that may arise, a landowner should not expect duty to hinge on a 
special relationship if it is equally foreseeable that someone outside 
of a special relationship will be injured by a condition on the 
land.136  Thus, equal protection is supported by Louis and previous 
Minnesota decisions.137  These decisions have allowed foreseeability 
to come to the forefront in premises liability decisions.138
In summary, requiring a special relationship to create duty in 
premises liability cases diminishes the importance of foreseeability 
in creating duty139 and limits equal protection promoted in past 
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.140 Louis avoids both of these 
outcomes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Louis, the Minnesota Supreme Court logically clarified that 
a landowner’s duty of reasonable care exists with or without a 
special relationship.  The Louis opinion provides predictability and 
consistency in premises liability cases.  In addition, Louis promotes 
the equal protection of all land entrants while emphasizing the 
importance of foreseeability and avoiding increased burdens upon 
landowners and our courts. Louis thus provides an appropriate 
balance between landowners’ rights and good public policy.
exceptions to the traditional category rules will lead to equal protection of all 
entrants).
133. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).
See also Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980).
134. Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996) (stating that 
changing a landowner’s duty to a reasonable care “places the focus where it should 
be,” upon foreseeability of injury rather than on the entrant’s status).
135. Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 322 n.9 (stating that foreseeability of harm is one of 
the factors Minnesota courts consider to determine if a landowner owes a duty to 
an entrant).
136. Id.
137. See Rowland, 443 P.2d at 569 (advocating for equal protection of all land 
entrants); see also Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647 (stating that all 
invited land entrants are owed a duty of reasonable care, regardless of status).
138. See Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 57 (stating that foreseeability of injury is more 
important than the entrant’s status).
139. Id.
140. See Balach, 294 Minn. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.
18
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